إقتباس :

A LOW output results only if both the inputs to the gate are HIGH. If one or both inputs are LOW, a HIGH output results.

إقتباس :قصدي ماذا يفعل البرنامج
هل هو باتش للعبة ؟؟
أم ماذا ؟؟؟؟

إقتباس :كيف يتم الحصول على ذاكرة ناناد فلاش اين تباع

إقتباس :كيف استطيع ان ابرمج الذاكرة يعني كيف البرطها بالحاسوب واثبت
عليها ملفات ال framware

إقتباس :جيوهوت

إقتباس :

PS3 security is DMA RSA, AES(2 modes), LPAR, and isolated SPE modes. lv0 loader does use RSA. everything else is ELF with AES and SHA1 on it's sections. The loaders holds keys and are deflated and decrypted in isolated SPEs using mailboxes and shadowing. Geohot got code execution by glitching in page table entries and then used dumps to find the mailbox proto for isolation mode, where he decrypted and dumped stuff. Later another team found an overflow in the recoke list buffer.


What a lot of people don't know about that is it was Geohot's russian friend and another guy who did the discoveries. Same story with apple products



Attacking AES:

Keys were leaked because using a buffer overflow in one of the early loaders LS was dumped which had enough AES keys inside to leverage most of the bootchain keys(all except lv0 key from ROM). The PS3 ECDSA RNG was also flawed.


Before the overflow all that could be done was building custom packages because signing keys were in RAM dumps.


PS3 is far less complex than x360 though even with the new firmwares. The new firmwares fix ECDSA and the overflow, and inline load all modules. You can still run unsigned code on new firmwares by injecting with an FPGA or using mapped SPI XDR lines on some models; this also gets VSH data for signing some packages. It'll take another LS exploit to get the new AES keys though. The PS3 is fully documented so nobody except private parties who want it for crunching numbers bothers with it. It's too much RCE and hardware cost to have fun with too